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ANNEX

ESTIMATE OF THE PRESENT STRENGTH AND EFFECTIVENESS OF THE CHINESE NATIONALIST REGULAR FORCES:

1. The Chinese Nationalist Army has a strength of 451,000 personnel organized into 38 infantry divisions, 4 armored groups, 1 paratroop group, 3 fort commands, 5 independent regiments and two independent battalions. The bulk of these forces is disposed on Formosa; some combat elements are located on Matsu, Quemoy, and the Pescadores Islands. The Nationalist Army has no significant number of trained reserves and under present circumstances its mobilization capacity is negligible. The mass induction of Formosan youths would not be feasible unless the US greatly expanded its proposed MDAP. Even in this event, the dependability and effectiveness of Formosan troops would be questionable. At the present time, the Nationalist Army is short of some types of ammunition, arms and other equipment and the materiel that is available is heterogeneous and poorly maintained. Because of these materiel deficiencies, the lack of reserve manpower, and the poor command structure (including the lack of interservice coordination) the combat effectiveness of the Nationalist Army is poor. After receipt of the proposed US materiel aid and after training in its use, its effectiveness will be substantially improved.

2. The Chinese Nationalist Air Force consists of 8 combat groups possessing 384 tactical aircraft. However, of this total, only 121 aircraft are serviceable for combat. These consist of 35 light bombers and 86 piston fighters predominantly of World War II design. Because of the lack

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of spare parts and improper maintenance facilities, the combat effectiveness of this force is very poor. Under conditions of sustained combat, particularly if opposed by jet aircraft, its capabilities would be reduced to a negligible factor in a day or two. In spite of these difficulties, the Chinese Nationalist Air Force is believed to have the organizational structure and necessary personnel to absorb and utilize the additional equipment necessary to make it an effective force. However, the present US aid program is not expected to improve the Nationalist Air Force or even maintain its present capabilities.

3. The Chinese Nationalist Navy consists of approximately 150 miscellaneous craft, the largest of which are seven destroyer-type vessels. Under optimum conditions and provided that there were no air or naval opposition, the Nationalists would be capable of transporting up to two divisions in assault by means of orthodox landing craft and following up with five or six water-lifted divisions. No amount of logistic support could immediately effect a great increase in the effectiveness of the Nationalist Navy. Training in large-scale operations, command reorganization, the removal of political intrigues, and other slowly achieved changes are prerequisites to any major improvement.

4. It is evident that the capabilities of the Chinese Nationalist Armed Forces are extremely limited. It is estimated that the Chinese Nationalists are at present incapable, by themselves, of defending Taiwan against an all-out assault by the Chinese Communist Forces. On the offensive side, the Chinese Nationalists could not at present establish a lodgement on the mainland without the full participation of US forces, including

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US ground forces. After receipt of proposed U. S. materiel aid and after training in its use, the Nationalist Army could provide 10 infantry divisions for an assault on the mainland, if the U. S. continued logistic support to the invasion force. However, since the presently proposed aid will not improve Nationalist air and naval capabilities, an attempted assault on the mainland still would have no hope of success unless the US provided powerful air and sea operational support.

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